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ARTICLES 
A LITTLE LESS CONVERSATION, A LITTLE MORE 
ACTION: EVALUATING AND FORECASTING THE 
TREND OF MORE FREQUENT AND SEVERE 
PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 
Justin F. Marceau*
In the wake of increasingly common, creative, and severe 
prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), 
scholars and practitioners must acknowledge that the time for talk—i.e., 
non-punitive voluntary disclosures and abstract debate—has given way 
to an era of aggressive enforcement actions by the Department of Justice 
and the Securities Exchange Commission.  The bare numbers tell much 
of the story: the Department of Justice has initiated four times more 
prosecutions over the last five years than over the previous five years.1  
Also instructive are prosecutors’ growing use of novel and ever more 
broad theories of liability under the FCPA. 
This Article outlines and discusses in particular the anti-bribery 
provisions of the FCPA, then identifies recent controversial cases that 
illustrate the government’s departure from its usual passive approach, 
and how the government has embraced a more aggressive, or legal, 
action position.  In addition, this Article forecasts other forthcoming 
theories of FCPA-liability that, although not yet advanced by the 
*  Mr. Marceau graduated from Harvard Law School in 2004.  He is currently 
working as an Assistant Public Defender in the Capital Habeas Unit of the Office of 
Public Defender, District of Arizona.  All views expressed in this article are those of the 
author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, the 
Office of the Public Defender.  The author wishes to thank his mother, Mary Marceau, 
for her careful and timely editing of this piece.  He also owes a debt of gratitude to his 
wife, Rebecca Aviel, for her thoughtful comments throughout the writing process and 
for marrying him in September of last year. 
 1. Dan Newcomb, Digests of Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to 
Foreign Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (Feb. 28, 2006), 
available at http://www.shearman.com/lt_022806/. 
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Department of Justice, are likely forthcoming from prosecutors based on 
their recent zealous theories of liability. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE FCPA 
Based upon information regarding corporate corruption uncovered 
during the Watergate investigations, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission conducted a series of investigations designed to evaluate 
how widespread the practice of corporate bribery to foreign officials had 
become.2  The Securities and Exchange Commission’s investigation 
resulted in disclosures by over 400 companies that had engaged in bribes 
or other corrupt payments.3  Of these, some 200 companies admitted to 
making bribe-type payments to foreign government officials.4  
Following these investigations, Congress held hearings to assess the 
severity of the bribery problem, and possible solutions.5  Shortly 
thereafter, in December 1977, Congress, perceiving this to be an 
epidemic, responded by passing the FCPA.6
From its inception, the FCPA was a bold and unique piece of 
legislation in that it criminalized conduct that Congress itself deemed 
unethical, regardless of the customs and practices of the foreign country 
where the company was doing business.7  The Act’s impact in early 
years was marred by controversies regarding the appropriateness of 
legislating morals,8 but corporate scandals in the 1990s readied the 
public for the government’s taking a more direct role in enforcing 
 2. Dan Zarin, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1-
1 (2005); see also Abuses of Corporate Power: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On 
Priorities and Econ. in Gov’t of the Joint Econ. Comm., 94th Cong. 16-18 (1976) 
(testimony of Roderick M. Hills, Chairman of the SEC); Wallace Timmeny, An 
Overview of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 235, 236-37 (1982). 
 3. Zarin, supra note 2. 
 4. Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure: 
Hearings on S. 305 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 
95th Cong. 116-18 (1977). 
 5. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, 
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND 
ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (May 14, 1976). 
 6. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1977). 
 7. Zarin, supra note 2, 1-2. 
 8. Id. at 1-2 (explaining that Congress justified the legislation, in part, by noting 
that a prohibition on bribery would ensure that the market was functioning properly and 
reward efficient business practices). 
2007 A LITTLE LESS CONVERSATION, 287 
 A LITTLE MORE ACTION 
 
ethical business practices.9  Taking advantage of the public interest in 
policing corporations more closely, the Department of Justice has 
demonstrated, both through prosecutions and public statements, a 
commitment to aggressively prosecute corporate bribery.10  Moreover, 
the unwillingness of many corporate defendants to challenge the Justice 
Department’s theory of liability in court, opting instead to accept a quick 
plea agreement in order to minimize negative publicity, has left 
prosecutors with an almost unchecked authority to define the contours of 
FCPA liability.  Accordingly, not until very recently has it become 
possible to appreciate just how drastic and far reaching the Department 
of Justice’s use of the FCPA will be. 
The short and relatively straightforward text of the Act belies the 
scope of liability sought by federal prosecutors.  The Department of 
Justice’s recent aggressive enforcement of the FCPA’s provisions has 
served to illustrate numerous unanticipated theories of liability.  This 
article argues that corporate defendants are now faced with a “Hobson’s 
Choice”: either accept the Department of Justice’s broad and 
unprincipled application of the FCPA, or confront the prolonged 
negative press that is sure to accompany a legal challenge to various 
theories of FCPA liability.  Specifically, in light of the recent upswing in 
prosecutions, and interpretations being made by the Department of 
Justice, parent companies, franchisors, non-U.S. residents, and other 
persons or entities with attenuated links to public officials face the risk 
of being charged under the FCPA.  As discussed below, not all of these 
theories of liability are the product of a reasoned interpretation of the 
FCPA. 
II. FCPA LIABILITY GENERALLY 
The FCPA makes it unlawful to bribe foreign government officials 
in order to obtain or retain business.11  The FCPA applies to individuals, 
 9. Marie Leone, Coming Clean about Bribery, CFO.com, Apr. 03, 2006 available 
at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/6764209?f=related (quoting a senior Department of 
Justice attorney as saying that there is “a new vigilance at the Department of Justice in 
terms of identifying and prosecuting FCPA violators”). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (2005).  The statute states that: 
[i]t shall be unlawful for any domestic concern . . . , or for any officer, director, 
employee, or agent of such domestic concern . . . , to make use of the mails or any 
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firms, officers, directors, employees, agents of a firm, and any 
stockholder acting on behalf of a firm.  In order to obtain a conviction 
under the anti-bribery portion of the statute, the government must prove, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is: 
1. a domestic concern12 (any corporation, partnership, 
association, . . . which has its principal place of 
business in the U.S., or which is organized under the 
laws of a state),13
2. that made use of a means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce,14
3. corruptly,15
4. in furtherance16 of an offer or payment of anything of 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, 
payment, [or] promise to pay . . . anything of value to . . . (3) any person, while 
knowing that all or a portion of such money . . . will be offered, given, or promised, 
directly or indirectly, to any foreign official . . . for purposes of  (A)(i) influencing any 
act or decision of such foreign official . . . in his . . . official capacity. 
Id. 
 12. Issuers, defined as entities that have a class of securities registered pursuant to 
§ 12 of the Securities Exchange Act, are also liable for violations of the FCPA.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (2005).  Issuers are subject to the same requirements under the 
FCPA as domestic concerns; however, because a company’s status as an issuer is easily 
determined and uncontroversial, this article focuses on the liability of domestic 
concerns.  Id. 
 13. The complete definition of “domestic concern” covers an even larger group of 
persons and entities:  individual U.S. citizens (wherever located), U.S. resident aliens, 
corporations, and other business entities organized under the laws of a state of the 
United States or having their principal place of business in the United States, and 
officers, directors, employees, and agents of these entities, regardless of their 
nationality.  See 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(h)(1). 
 14. Generally speaking, courts have taken a very broad interpretation of “interstate 
commerce” such that this jurisdictional requirement will, in most cases, be easily 
satisfied.  The Act itself provides an exhaustive definition of interstate commerce.  15 
U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), 2(a), 2(h)(5). 
 15. The term “corruptly” was explained in the legislative history of the FCPA: 
“[the term] is used to make clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift must be 
intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order wrongfully to 
direct business to the payor or his client.”  S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977) (emphasis 
added).  In other words, there must be some sort of evil motive or purpose behind the 
payment.  For a complete discussion of the interpretation of “corruptly,” see generally 
Gary M. Elden & Mark S. Sablemann, Negligence Is Not Corruptive: The Scienter 
Requirement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 819 (1981).  
Notably, it is the subjective intent of the payor that is determinative, and the bribe need 
not be successful in order for liability to exist.  Zarin, supra note 2, at 4-15. 
 16. The “in furtherance” language was included to emphasize that the use of the 
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value to any person, 
5. while knowing17 that anything of value18 would be 
offered or given directly or indirectly to any foreign 
official, and19
6. for purposes of influencing any act or decision of such 
foreign official in his official capacity. 
In the straightforward context of a single company or individual 
directly involved in the challenged payments, FCPA liability likely 
exists if these elements are satisfied and an exception or defense does 
not apply.  However, as the following discussion of three recent 
prosecutions under the FCPA illustrates, determining whether the 
elements of liability are satisfied when applied to a complicated 
instrumentality of commerce did not have to be essential to the scheme of corrupt 
payments.  See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, (1989) (recognizing that the 
use of an instrumentality of commerce need only be incident to an essential part of the 
scheme). 
 17. Knowledge, for purposes of the FCPA, does not require actual knowledge.  The 
relevant portions of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(2), -2(h)(3), provide for liability in 
circumstances where the individual or entity consciously disregards impropriety.  H.R. 
REP. NO. 100-576, at 918-19, (1988) (Conf. Rep.) as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1547, 1951-52.  Commentators have suggested that this applies to both past and future 
corrupt payments.  See, e.g., Zarin, supra note 2, at 4-38. 
 18. Zarin, supra note 2, at 4-29 (noting that, as used in other statutes, the term has 
been construed broadly to include “both tangible and intangible benefits that an official 
subjectively believes to be of value”). 
 19. The definition of “foreign official” is somewhat broader than the term implies.  
For purposes of the FCPA, a “foreign official” is “any officer or employee of a foreign 
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting 
in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, 
or instrumentality, or for on behalf of any such public international organization.”  15 
U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2).  In the past, the Department of Justice has suggested using the 
FCPA Opinion Procedure for particular questions as to the definition—i.e., whether a 
member of the royal family, or a member of legislative body, or an official of a state-
owned business constitute foreign officials.  Without requesting Department of Justice 
guidance, however, the obvious take-away point is that prosecutors are taking a liberal 
view as to what constitutes a foreign official.  Dep’t of Justice brochure, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/dojdocb.htm; see, e.g., FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT v.1, 106.020 (2005) (explaining that the FCPA “has broad coverage and 
can apply to individuals whose ‘official’ status may not be readily apparent”); FCPA 
Op. No. 03-01 (Jan. 15, 2003) (assuming without discussing “that payments to 
individuals employed by foreign state-owned entities to obtain or retain business” 
constitute payments to foreign officials for purposes of FCPA liability); FCPA Op. No. 
94-01 (May 13, 1994). 
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corporate entity is far from mechanical. 
III. THREE RECENT FCPA ACTIONS 
Previous prosecutorial actions by government attorneys must be 
analyzed in order to develop the new concepts of liability I will discuss 
in this article.  I will discuss the following three anti-corruption 
enforcement actions: (1) the Oily Rock indictment; (2) the “NatWest 
Three” case; and (3) the Diagnostic Products plea.  These three will 
provide the basis necessary for understanding why I propose the new 
theories of possible liability. 
In October 2005, the United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York indicted three individuals for their respective roles 
in an alleged bribery scheme relating to the privatization of the 
Azerbaijani oil industry.20  These indictments raise rather novel issues 
regarding culpability, in that at least one of the individuals, David 
Pinkerton, was not alleged to have been involved in making any of the 
bribe payments or in negotiating any of the bribes.21
In 2002, three citizens of the United Kingdom who lived and 
worked in England, the now infamous “NatWest Three,” were indicted 
and extradited for their role in a complicated accounting scheme 
involving their employers NatWest and Enron.22  The criminal charges 
against these men has stirred considerable controversy regarding the 
Department of Justice’s decision to prosecute persons who are not 
residents or citizens of the United States, or responsible for any harm to 
a U.S. company.  Nonetheless, the trials of these men will likely be 
scheduled within the next few months.23
The final example used to illustrate the Department of Justice’s 
 20. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Announces Charges in Massive Scheme to 
Bribe Senior Government Officials in The Republic Of Azerbaijan (Oct. 6, 2005), 
available at www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/Press%20Releases/October%2005/Kozeny%20et
%20al.% 20Indictment%20PR.pdf. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Indictment, U.S. v. David Bermingham, Giles Darby, and Gary Mulgrew, 
(Sept. 12, 2002), available at news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usbrmnghm91202 
ind.pdf. 
 23. Id.  Similarly, in July 2006, a case was brought against three former employees 
of a Swiss Company, ABB.  All three are U.K. citizens.  Litigation Release, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Files FCPA Charges Against Four Former Senior Employees of 
ABB Ltd. Subsidiaries (July 5, 2006) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
litreleases/2006/lr19754.htm. 
2007 A LITTLE LESS CONVERSATION, 291 
 A LITTLE MORE ACTION 
aggressive FCPA posture is the guilty plea by a wholly owned Chinese 
subsidiary to anti-bribery charges.  In 2005, Diagnostic Products 
Corporation, a wholly owned Chinese subsidiary, pled guilty to a 
violation of the anti-bribery provision of the FCPA.  This plea was made 
despite the fact that the foreign entity, on the face of the pleading, 
appears not to have committed a single act in furtherance of the corrupt 
payments while in the United States.  These three examples are 
illustrative of recent FCPA cases being brought by federal prosecutors, 
and serve as a meaningful starting point for assessing the likelihood of 
prosecution in several historically controversial FCPA fact patterns.  
These three cases will be discussed in more detail below. 
A. Oily Rock Charges 
In October 2005, federal prosecutors announced charges in what 
was called a “massive scheme to bribe senior government officials in the 
republic of Azerbaijan.”24  The indictments charged that Viktor Kozeny, 
along with his attorney and associate, carried out a scheme to bribe 
Azeri officials in order to induce privatization of the country’s state-
owned oil company.25  According to the indictment, Kozeny’s ultimate 
purpose in offering the bribes was to ensure that his investment 
company, Oily Rock, gained a controlling interest in what was to 
become a lucrative private oil company.26  Kozeny’s bribery scheme, 
though unique in magnitude,27 does not raise any particularly interesting 
FCPA issues.  However, the indictment of several U.S. investors who 
had invested substantial amounts of money in Kozeny’s privatization 
scheme, either on their own, or for the investment funds they managed, 
is a notable example of the Justice Department’s aggressive application 
of the FCPA. 
Over time, Kozeny recruited other individual and institutional 
 
 24. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Announces Charges in Massive Scheme to 
Bribe Senior Government Officials in The Republic Of Azerbaijan (Oct. 6, 2005), 
available at www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/Press%20Releases/October%2005/Kozeny%20et 
%20al.%20Indictment%20PR.pdf. 
 25. Id. at 4. 
 26. Id. 
 27. The indictment alleged that Kozeny had flown “millions of dollars of cash [for 
use in the bribery scheme] into Azerbaijan on [his] private jet.”  Id. at 3. 
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investors to join in the scheme.28  One such investor was David 
Pinkerton, who was responsible for overseeing AIG’s investments in 
Azerbaijan.  The indictment alleges that Pinkerton, in his capacity as a 
managing director for AIG, invested around $15,000,000 in Kozeny’s 
scheme.29
By charging Pinkerton for his investment in Kozeny’s companies, 
including Oily Rock, the Department of Justice has demonstrated a 
willingness to spend government resources to prosecute individuals who 
were not in any way involved in negotiating or paying bribes to foreign 
officials.30  The government does not allege that Pinkerton himself was 
engaged in any unsavory conduct; indeed, it seems that Pinkerton simply 
invested some of AIG’s assets in Kozeny’s various entities.  The 
government does allege, however, that Pinkerton had knowledge of the 
fact that Kozeny “entered into a corrupt financial relationship,” and that 
this knowledge constitutes a sufficient nexus to the scheme to give rise 
to FCPA liability.31
The implications of the Oily Rock indictment are fairly obvious.  
Consistent with the Department of Justice’s clearly stated intent to “hone 
in on FCPA violators,”32 the indictment of individuals like Pinkerton 
reflects the trend of aggressive and unflinching enforcement actions 
under the FCPA.  Pinkerton, a managerial investment banker, had what 
can only be described as an attenuated connection to Kozeny’s scheme.  
Pinkerton did not pay any bribes, nor did he negotiate or facilitate any of 
those bribes.  It seems that he did not even directly authorize the 
improper payments to Azeri officials.33  Pinkerton’s 2005 indictment 
demonstrates the Department of Justice’s willingness to pursue and 
prosecute not just the key players in a bribery scheme, but anyone who 
facilitates a scheme, and is subject to federal FCPA jurisdiction.  
Though not at odds with the text of the Act, prosecutions like this are 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.    
 31. Pinkerton continues to deny any knowledge of Kozeny’s bribery scheme.  His 
lawyer was recently quoted as saying, “Pinkerton first heard this allegation [of bribery] 
in response to his efforts to chase Viktor Kozeny around the globe to recoup AIG’s 
investment.”  Rob Urban & David Glovin, Capturing the Pirate of Prague, Bloomberg 
Market Reports (Mar. 2006). 
 32. Marie Leone, Coming Clean About Bribery, CFO.com, Apr. 3, 2006, available 
at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/6764209/c_2984290/?f=archives. 
 33. Id. 
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indicative of the willingness of prosecutors to devote precious time and 
effort to prosecute those who have only a secondary role in a corrupt 
scheme. 
B. The NatWest Three Case 
In 2002, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of 
Texas issued an indictment that is illustrative of the Department of 
Justice’s willingness to doggedly pursue corruption prosecutions despite 
serious foreign sovereignty issues.34  Though the prosecution was for 
wire fraud, federal prosecutors exhibited no compunction about 
prosecuting persons and entities who had only minimal or secondary 
connections to the United States.35  Giles Darby, David Bermingham, 
and Gary Mulgrew, (“the NatWest Three,”) were indicted on charges 
relating to their role in the Enron scandal.  Specifically, the NatWest 
Three are charged with persuading their employer, NatWest, to sell an 
investment company at a fraction of its value to the CFO of Enron, who 
in turn split the profits with the three men.36  All three of the NatWest 
defendants were United Kingdom nationals.  All three resided and 
worked in England, and the harm caused by the corrupt deal, it appears, 
was visited only upon NatWest, a United Kingdom bank.  Therefore, 
what makes this prosecution interesting is its total lack of connection to 
the United States. 
Despite the lack of a clear connection to U.S. interests in the case, 
federal prosecutors deemed the individuals conduct, viewed as “in 
furtherance” of the corrupt scheme that occurred in the U.S., a sufficient 
basis for prosecution.  This makes clear that the Department of Justice 
will prosecute non-U.S. citizens whose corrupt behavior does not 
directly harm U.S. interests on the theory that corruption, be it indirect 
or otherwise, must be prosecuted in order to establish the appropriate 
international culture of deterrence.  As one commentator put it, the 
“NatWest Three” case is a “particularly dramatic example of the 
aggressive extension of U.S. law beyond its borders.”37
 
 34. Indictment, U.S. v. David Bermingham, Giles Darby, and Gary Mulgrew, 
(Sept. 12, 2002), available at news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usbrmnghm91202 
ind.pdf. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Matt Morley, Bung Patrol, Aug. 31, 2006, available at http://www. 
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C. The Diagnostics Guilty Plea 
A final example of the Department of Justice’s increasingly 
aggressive approach to corruption is a 2005 FCPA enforcement action 
against DPC.38  The DPC enforcement action is perhaps the clearest 
example of the willingness of federal prosecutors to pursue criminal 
charges in cases where either jurisdiction, or liability, or both, is 
anything but obvious.  That is to say, DPC is indicative of a growing 
body of enforcement actions featuring federal prosecutors willing to 
expend resources investigating and prosecuting corruption cases where 
the statutory authority for such prosecutions is, at best, strained. 
DPC, a producer and seller of diagnostic medical equipment, was 
charged with violating the FCPA for its role in the payment of $1.6 
million in bribes to physicians and laboratory personnel employed by 
government-owned hospitals in China.39  The alleged bribes were paid 
between 1991 and 2002 in order to obtain and retain business 
relationships with these hospitals.40  Specifically, it was alleged that 
DPC “made cash payments to laboratory personnel and physicians 
employed in certain hospitals . . . in exchange for agreements that the 
hospitals would obtain [DPC’s products and services].”41  What makes 
this enforcement action significant is the theory of jurisdiction that 
prosecutors adopted in this case. 
Following the 1998 amendments to the FCPA, foreign national 
employees and subsidiaries were subject to independent FCPA liability 
for the first time.42  Under the amendments, foreign nationals and 
corporations were subject to liability under the FCPA so long as the 
person or entity committed an act in furtherance of the corrupt payment 
“while in the territory of the United States.”43  It is clear from both the 
plain text of amendments,44 and the legislative history45 that the exercise 
 
thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=121582. 
 38. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, DPC (Tianjin) Ltd. Charged with Violating The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (May 20, 2005), available at www.usdoj.gov/criminal/ 
fraud /press/dpcfcpa.pdf. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
366, § 4, 112 Stat. 3302, 3306 (1998). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Zarin, supra note 2, at 4-8 (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-802 to accompany H.R. 
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of independent jurisdiction over a foreign entity was limited to those 
situations where the foreign entity committed an act in furtherance of the 
bribe while in the United States.  However, DPC was a wholly owned 
Chinese subsidiary of a California company that had not itself 
committed any acts within the United States.46
Prior to this case, commentators and practitioners had agreed that 
liability would not exist on these facts because there was no indication 
that DPC satisfied the prerequisites for FCPA liability under the 1998 
amendments.  Based on the text of the plea agreement, it appears that the 
prosecutors charged DPC with violations of the FCPA on the theory that 
DPC was acting as an “agent” of its U.S.-based parent company.47  
Prosecuting DPC as an agent of its parent company, however, is 
inconsistent with legislative history suggesting that the 1998 
Amendments provided the first and only basis for foreign subsidiary 
liability, and is in direct tension with the only case law on point.48  
Indeed, courts had concluded that permitting foreign subsidiary liability 
under the provisions of the FCPA allowing for “agent” liability 
contravened the clear legislative history on the question of foreign entity 
liability.49  Congress had specifically considered extending liability to 
foreign entities and declined to do so.50
Whether right or wrong, the DPC prosecution represented a 
dramatic departure from previous norms regarding the appropriate scope 
of FCPA prosecutions, and signals an increasingly aggressive policy of 
prosecution that individuals and entities must deal with.  The remainder 
of this Article will use cases like DPC, ultimately resolved through a 
guilty plea,51 as a weathervane to predict how federal prosecutors will 
respond to many of the remaining or common questions regarding 
FCPA liability. 
 
4353, International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 21 (Oct. 8, 1998)). 
 46. Press Release, supra note 37; Zarin, supra note 2, at 4-9, 4-10. 
 47. Zarin, supra note 2, 4-10 (citing Plea Agreement, United States v. DPC 
(Tianjin) Co. Ltd., (C.D. Cal. 2005)). 
 48. See supra note 45 (regarding the relevant legislative history); Dooley v. United 
Techs. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1992). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Press Release, supra note 37. 
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IV. BEYOND THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE STATUTE:  
THE LONG ARM OF THE FCPA 
Given the tenor and scope of recent FCPA indictments, several 
theories of liability under the FCPA seem to be gaining traction.  This 
Article discusses situations in which liability does not appear to be 
obvious from the plain text of the FCPA. 
A. Parent Company Liability Under the FCPA 
The least controversial, and most routinely accepted extension of 
FCPA liability concerns parent company liability.  Although the FCPA 
does not contain specific provisions regarding parent company liability, 
commentators and the Department of Justice have conclusively 
established that parent companies may face liability for the actions of 
their foreign or domestic subsidiaries based on three somewhat 
overlapping theories: (1) direct liability, (2) indirect liability, and (3) 
agency liability, with parent company liability under the FCPA being 
triggered if the relationship between the parent and the improper 
payments at issue satisfies the requirements for liability under any one 
of the three.52
1. Direct Liability 
The first basis for parent company liability turns on whether or not 
the parent was directly involved in the improper conduct.53  The FCPA 
specifically provides for direct parent liability in several circumstances: 
(1) the commission of an act “in furtherance of” the improper payment 
by the parent entity; (2) the “authorization” by the parent company of 
the subsidiary’s action; or (3) a direct offer, promise or transfer of value 
by the parent.54  Stated more succinctly, the parent corporation may be 
held liable for the acts of its foreign subsidiaries when the parent 
authorizes, directs, or controls the activity in question.55
Because the FCPA does not provide a specific basis for parent 
 
 52. See, e.g., Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1998). 
 53. See  H.R. REP. No. 95-831, at 14 (1977) (Conf. Rep.). 
 54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a) (2005). 
 55. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Anti-Bribery Provisions 3 
(1999). 
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company liability, each of the elements discussed above must be present.  
Accordingly, as with any other entity or individual, liability under the 
FCPA is predicated on “knowledge.”  The parent is not liable absent 
knowledge of the corrupt purpose of the payment.56  For purposes of the 
FCPA, a person acts with “knowledge” if: (1) the person is aware that he 
or she is engaging in the conduct; (2) the person has a firm belief that a 
result is substantially certain to occur;57 or (3) “if a person is aware of a 
high probability of the existence of such circumstance . . . .”58  While the 
requisite state of mind under the FCPA includes conscious disregard, or 
willful blindness,59 the legislative history is clear in reflecting that mere 
negligence does not provide a basis for liability.  Congress was instead 
concerned with the “head-in-the-sand problem.”60
2. Indirect  Liability 
The FCPA prohibits a domestic concern, or its agent, from giving 
anything of value to another person while “knowing that this third party 
will make an improper payment to a foreign official.”61  This broad 
definition of knowledge for purposes of the FCPA, allows criminal 
liability to be grounded on acquiescence in the subsidiary’s corrupt 
payment.62  Mere inaction on the part of the parent company may 
 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A).  The statute does not appear to criminalize 
innocent knowledge of a payment that turns out to be improper.  Parent liability under 
the FCPA only exists where all of the elements of the crime are satisfied, and the 
knowledge element cannot be separated from the corrupt payment element.  Thus, 
although a parent can be liable for the actions of its subsidiaries, the plain text of the 
statute dictates that liability only exists when the domestic concern has knowledge of 
the corrupt purpose of the payment.  The FCPA provides in relevant part that the 
domestic concern is only liable if it has “know[ledge] that all or a portion of [the] 
money . . . will be offered . . . for purposes of  . . . (A)(i) influencing any act or decision 
of [a] foreign official.”  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a).  In other words, a “corrupt payment” is 
one that is made to influence a foreign official and there cannot be liability under the 
FCPA unless the domestic concern had knowledge, not just of the payment, but of the 
fact that payment was made “for purposes of” influencing a foreign official.  Id. 
 57. 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(h)(3)(A)(I). 
 58. 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(h)(3)(B). 
 59. See U. S. v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 277-88 (2d Cir. 1977) (applying a similar 
mental state requirement in a separate context). 
 60. H.R. Rep. No. 100-579, at 920 (1988) (Conf. Rep.). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(h)(3)(A). 
 62. See United States v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas, 427 F.2d 969, 971 (10th 
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provide a basis for FCPA liability because the parent may be treated as 
having implicitly authorized the payment.  For example, if the parent 
became aware of an improper payment and did not do anything to stop 
it, a court may consider this acquiescence in the payments to be a 
sufficient basis for FCPA liability. 
It is important to note that where a parent company exercises 
control over a subsidiary or affiliate, the failure to address red flags 
regarding corrupt payments presents a real risk that the parent may be 
charged with knowledge of said corrupt payment.63  In the alternative, if 
the parent company can show that it did not have any knowledge of the 
corrupt payments, liability under the FCPA does not attach.64
As discussed above, acquiescence in corrupt payments made by a 
subsidiary may create liability exposure for the parent.  A critical issue 
for parent companies facing FCPA liability will be the extent to which 
suspicious payments made by a subsidiary were documented and 
discussed with the parent.  If the putatively improper payments were 
documented in a manner that should have raised red flags, there is a 
strong argument that the parent is indirectly liable under a conscious 
disregard theory of knowledge. 
3. Agency Law and the FCPA 
One theory of parent company liability that has remained beyond 
the scope of the Justice Department’s broad reading of the FCPA is a 
strict application of common law principles of agency.  If the 
Department of Justice sought to apply agency law to FCPA 
prosecutions, a court could find that the parent company had 
constructive knowledge if the subsidiary is deemed to be acting as an 
agent of the parent.  Basic agency law treats a “master or other principal 
. . . [as] liable to another whose interests have been invaded by the 
tortious conduct of a servant or other agent, although the principal does 
 
Cir.1970) (imputing knowledge of domestic conspiracy charge based on conduct of a 
recently acquired company). 
 63. See, e.g., ABA Center for Continuing Legal Education, Parent Company 
Liability Under the FCPA, (2002) (providing the following example: “if management of 
the subsidiary reports to the parent a request for payments by local officials, the failure 
of the parent to react to that information—even if it is mentioned in cryptic terms as an 
aside at a management meeting or late at night over drinks in a bar to a single parent 
official—may create a situation of arguable ‘knowledge’ for the parent.”). 
 64. 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(h)(3)(A). 
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not personally violate a duty.”65  Where corporate liability is concerned, 
the agent’s act must be intended, at least in part, to benefit the 
corporation.66  According to agency law, if a foreign entity is found to 
be an agent of a domestic concern, the domestic concern may be held 
vicariously liable for the corrupt practices of that foreign affiliate.67
Courts have held that the existence of an agency relationship 
between a parent and a subsidiary is a question of fact to be determined 
at trial.68  As one commentator has noted, “[t]he touchstone of 
parent/subsidiary agency liability is the involvement of the parent in the 
affairs of the subsidiary.”69  The question of whether or not an agency 
relationship exists depends on the degree of control that the parent 
enjoys over the subsidiary, not on whether a majority of voting shares 
are held by the parent.70
To date, the Department of Justice appears to use the control 
inherent in an agency relationship merely as indicia of the culpable 
knowledge required for criminal liability.  However, if agency law was 
truly extended to the FCPA, in circumstances where sufficient authority 
and control over the foreign affiliate is found,71 the parent corporation 
 65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 216 (1958); U.S. v. Armour & Co., 168 
F.2d 342 (3rd Cir. 1948). 
 66. William Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations § 4877. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Royal Indus. v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 926 F.Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 69. Brown, supra note 52, at 36. 
 70. As a practical matter, practitioners have identified several indicia of an agency 
relationship: (1) The entity owns all or a majority of the stock of the foreign affiliate; 
(2) The entity and the foreign affiliate have common directors or officers; (3) The entity 
finances the foreign affiliate; (4) The foreign affiliate has grossly inadequate capital; 
(5) The entity pays the salaries or expenses or losses of the foreign affiliate; (6) The 
foreign affiliate has substantially no business except with the entity or no assets except 
those conveyed to it by the entity; (7) The entity formally refers to the foreign affiliate 
as a subsidiary, department, or division; (8) The directors or management of the foreign 
affiliate do not act independently in its interests but take direction from the entity.  See 
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, Georgetown Univ. Law Center, Continuing 
Legal Education, 2003 WL 22002142 (2003). 
 71. Although the factors outlined above are useful, the best indicator as to whether 
an agency relationship exists is practical control.  In the words of one commentator, 
“Practical control will have much greater bearing than technical legal considerations [in 
determining whether a foreign company is an agent of the domestic concern.]”  Stuart 
H. Deming, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the New International Norms 35 
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may be liable for any violations of the FCPA regardless of actual 
knowledge or conscious disregard.  A domestic concern that exerts a 
sufficient level of control over a foreign affiliate to establish an agency 
relationship faces the same responsibility for preventing improper 
payments by the foreign affiliate as it does with its own employees.72  
Although it does not appear that there have been any federal 
prosecutions based on this agency theory of liability alone, given the 
Justice Department’s relatively unchecked approach to FCPA liability, 
companies need to anticipate FCPA liability for the conduct of its agent-
subsidiaries. 
In sum, a parent corporation is liable for the corrupt payments made 
by its subsidiary if: (1) the parent is directly responsible for the 
subsidiary’s action—i.e., authorizes the payment; (2) the parent has 
knowledge of the corrupt payment73—i.e., impliedly authorizes the 
payment; or, theoretically, (3) an agency relationship exists between the 
parent and the subsidiary such that the subsidiary is deemed acting as an 
agent of the parent.  While the third theory of liability remains 
theoretical, insofar as no prosecutions have utilized this basis, it is more 
consistent with the indirect liability provisions of the FCPA than other 
theories advanced by the Department of Justice.74
B. Liability of a Franchisor 
In light of the Justice Department’s overall aggressive posture 
toward bribery payments, it appears highly likely that the Department of 
Justice will be willing to prosecute, under FCPA law, a franchisor for 
the acts of a franchisee.  Vicarious franchisor liability traditionally arises 
from a franchisor’s interest in protecting its franchise name.  Protection 
for the franchise name is accomplished by actively prohibiting unsavory 
 
(2005). 
 72. If an agency relationship exists and the domestic concern learns that the foreign 
affiliate has made corrupt payments, the domestic concern must affirmatively repudiate 
the unlawful conduct and take significant measures to prevent its recurrence in order to 
avoid FCPA liability.  Id. 
 73. The FCPA’s imputation of knowledge to one who consciously disregards 
information establishes a standard of knowledge considerably broader than actual 
knowledge.  Under this standard, if an individual or entity becomes aware of 
questionable conduct by a related third party, it must be diligent in undertaking its own 
inquiry.  A failure to inquire when red flags exist could result in the imputation of 
knowledge to an individual or entity regarding the improper conduct. 
 74. See supra note 38 (regarding the DPC charges). 
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businesspersons from obtaining a license to sell products under that 
name.  Based on previous Justice Department action, franchisor liability, 
much like indirect parent liability, appears to be premised on conscious 
disregard of the wrongdoers’ actions, and the presumption that 
significant due diligence occurred in determining whether a particular 
entity is or is not worthy of a franchise license.  This expectation of due 
diligence is premised, in large part, on provisions of The Lanham Act.75  
Under the Lanham Act, a trademark may be deemed abandoned if said 
mark is used in such a manner so as to cause a loss of significance.  In 
order to avoid losing the benefits of the trademark, companies must 
protect against deceptive uses by other persons or companies.  It appears 
likely that, if litigated, the Department of Justice will argue a company’s 
protection of its trademark gives rise to an agency relationship, and 
therefore, vicarious liability. 
Courts, without more, have been unwilling to equate this defense of 
image to the control and accountability that renders it vicariously liable 
for the acts of its franchisee;76  that said, however, this relationship may 
dictate that vicarious liability is appropriate.77  Terms of the franchise 
agreement, as well as their course of dealings, may determine whether 
the franchisor enjoyed a level of control over the franchisee sufficient to 
justify vicarious liability.78  The Fifth Circuit has found sufficient 
evidence of control by the franchisor where the franchisee, among other 
things, agreed to abide by the “rules of operation” promulgated by the 
 75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq.  An oft cited example of the need for franchisor due 
diligence is the recent anti-terrorism laws.  For example, Executive Order 13224 
prohibits transactions with suspected terrorists and although the order is silent as to 
franchisor liability, franchise lawyers have suggested that the franchisor has duties 
under this law.  According to some practitioners, franchisors are responsible for 
conducting thorough due diligence in order to assess whether the prospective franchisee 
is at risk for violating this law.  Id.  If this executive order, and other provisions of the 
PATRIOT ACT, which make no specific reference to franchisor liability, are 
understood to require extreme caution on the part of the franchisor in determining 
whether a specific company would conduct the franchise in a manner consistent with 
these laws, it is reasonable to conclude that the FCPA also could be applied to 
companies involved in international franchising. 
 76. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Coldwell Banker Inc., 59 Cal. App 4th (1997) (holding that 
franchisor’s receipt of royalty payment did not create true agency relationship such that 
franchisor could be liable for acts and omissions of franchisee’s broker). 
 77. See discussion of indirect liability, supra Part IV.A.2. 
 78. Id. 
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franchisor, built and maintained the premises and decorations in a 
manner consistent with the franchisor’s specifications, and agreed to 
allow inspection of the facility by the franchisor.79  This case shows that 
a court can hold a franchisor vicariously liable for the FCPA violations 
of its franchisee if said franchisor retains a certain level of control and 
authority over the franchisee.80  There is little doubt that the Department 
of Justice will attempt to assert franchisor liability; when, however, 
evidence of actual knowledge of corrupt payments is lacking, a strong 
argument can be made that a franchisor cannot be held liable under the 
FCPA.  It is highly probable that the Department of Justice will, until 
deprived of the argument by published opinion, consider franchisors 
liable for improper payments made by a franchisee. 
C. Successor Liability 
It is becoming increasingly clear that the Department of Justice will 
attempt to prosecute domestic companies for acquiring a foreign entity if 
said foreign entity has escaped FCPA liability solely because it was not 
a U.S. company at the time the improper payments were made.  In 
certain circumstances, the actions of a foreign company prior to its 
acquisition by a domestic corporation may raise FCPA issues for the 
acquiring company.  This stems from the fact that the Department of 
Justice does not want to create incentives for foreign companies to bribe 
public officials by allowing U.S. companies to acquire them at such a 
price and in such a manner so as to effectively reimburse the foreign 
company for its corrupt payments.  The indirect liability provisions of 
the FCPA trigger a U.S. acquirer company’s liability.81  Consistent with 
liability in normal circumstances, the U.S. successor company’s FCPA 
liability turns on whether it had knowledge of, or authorized, a corrupt 
payment. 
Generally, commentators seem to agree that a “U.S. company 
should not be liable for the activities of a foreign partner or related 
 
 79. Wood v. Holiday Inns, Inc. 509 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1975).  See also Nichols v. 
Arthur Murray, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 610 (1967). 
 80. At this point, companies are still left to speculate as to what sort of control 
would be sufficient to justify franchisor vicarious liability.  It seems clear, however, that 
the Department of Justice will be willing to prosecute a franchisor who, rather than 
simply passively receiving quarterly financials, plays an active role in the day-to-day 
management of the franchisee’s business. 
 81. 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(a)(3) (2005). 
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company prior to entering the relationship.”82  However, neither the text 
of the statute, the annotations, or case law, provides guidance on this 
issue.  Given the Department of Justice’s aggressive application of the 
FCPA, U.S. companies may face liability if circumstances are such that 
the Department of Justice can reasonably argue that the FCPA’s 
knowledge requirement has been satisfied.  Specifically, if a bribe was 
paid in order to secure a benefit that the acquiring U.S. company will 
share, and the acquiring U.S. company authorized the payment, or was 
aware of and consciously disregarded the probability of such a payment 
occurring, then the company can be charged as vicariously liable.83  The 
limited authority available on this topic suggest two significant factors in 
determining possible successor liability for past actions: (1) the extent of 
due diligence conducted to identify and address potential issues; and 
(2) the extent and effectiveness of safeguards adopted to foreclose 
reimbursement by the U.S. company for past improper actions and to 
prevent the acquired company from taking improper action in the 
future.84
Viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, a successor 
company may face liability for bribes paid by an acquired company 
when it is reasonable to conclude that the successor company is 
effectively reimbursing the acquired company for prior bribes, or where 
the successor acquires a company with knowledge of the fact that the 
acquired company will make such payments in the future.  Successor 
liability shares a critical common denominator with the theories of 
parent company indirect liability discussed above: where the U.S. parent 
or successor company authorizes a bribe, FCPA liability attaches.85  
Accordingly, an acquiring company’s first obligation must be to conduct 
sufficient due diligence in order to document the fact that they are not 
aware of, or consciously disregarding, any past corrupt payments.  If the 
acquiring company learns that the acquired entity paid bribes in the past, 
the acquiring company faces additional hurdles required to remain clear 
of FCPA liability.86
 82. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT v.1, 106.013, (2005). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Zarin, supra note 2, at 4-35 n.133 (noting that knowledge of the illicit payment 
is an implicit predicate to “authorization”). 
 86. Specifically, the Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange 
Commission have emphasized that acquiring companies that discover FCPA issues in 
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D. Controlling and Non-Controlling Investors 
A related but distinct issue of parent company liability is whether a 
domestic company with an ownership interest in a foreign company may 
face FCPA liability.  While a parent-subsidiary relationship dictates a 
degree of control authority in favor of the parent, companies with an 
investment interest in foreign companies—e.g, investment funds—may 
not enjoy the same effective control over the business operations of that 
foreign company; in spite of this difference, it is likely that federal 
prosecutors will bring charges in these circumstances. 
The plain text of the FCPA does not distinguish between a 
controlling and non-controlling affiliation.87  As with the other theories 
of liability discussed in this Article, the company’s liability will hinge 
on whether the U.S. company had knowledge of, and authorized, the 
improper conduct; not on a formal arrangement of control or a majority 
stake ownership.  Accordingly, it is possible that an investment company 
owning a majority of shares in a foreign company might not face FCPA 
liability for improper payments made by the foreign company, while an 
investment company owning a minority of shares in the same company 
might, based on its knowledge of the foreign company’s conduct.  This 
question is one of function over form: a majority shareholder is more 
likely to face FCPA liability because the majority shareholder is more 
likely to have knowledge of any corrupt relationship between the foreign 
company and public officials, not because it owns a majority of the 
 
pre-transaction due diligence are expected to commit to implement “rigorous” 
anticorruption compliance programs.  FCPA Opinion Procedure Rel. 04-02. An 
illustrative example is FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 03-01 (January 15, 2003).  In 
this opinion the Department of Justice addressed the concerns of a requestor who had 
intended to purchase the stock of a company, when during its due diligence the 
requestor learned that officers of a foreign subsidiary of said company had authorized 
payments to foreign officials to obtain business benefits.  The Department of Justice 
concluded that the following actions by the requestor were sufficient to alleviate 
concern that by acquiring the company it would also acquire criminal and civil liability 
for the past acts of the company’s employees: (1) continued cooperation and reporting 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice regarding 
the details of the past transactions, (2) discipline employees and officers who authorized 
corrupt payments, (3) disclose any additional pre-acquisition payments to foreign 
officials made by the acquired company, (4) a compliance program will be implemented 
in the acquired company and all of its subsidiaries, and (5) requestor ensures that 
acquired company implements a system of internal controls and makes and keeps 
accurate books. 
 87. Zarin, supra note 2, at 6-11. 
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shares of a company engaged in corrupt payments.88
The question of FCPA liability for affiliating with foreign 
companies will generally turn on whether the U.S. company had 
knowledge of the improper conduct.  This makes it particularly 
important for companies to consider whether any employees of the U.S. 
company are acting as officers or directors for the foreign affiliate.89  If 
a foreign company is involved in bribery payments, and employees of 
the U.S. shareholder are acting as officers or directors, it is likely that 
these officers or directors have knowledge of the bribes.  Whether the 
U.S. company is a controlling shareholder or not, it is likely that the 
U.S. company will face FCPA liability.  In order to avoid liability, the 
U.S. company has to, at a minimum, disavow the acts of bribery and 
take affirmative steps to avoid a reoccurrence.90  Particularly in the case 
of a U.S. majority owner of a foreign entity, however, FCPA liability 
likely exists and these remedial measures, as well as continued self-
reporting, serve only as an olive branch designed to mitigate harm and 
minimize penalties.91
 88. Id. 
 89. The common law concept of constructive knowledge dictates that the 
“knowledge of the employees is the knowledge of the corporation.”  Apex Oil Co. v. 
United States, 550 F.2d 1291, 1295 (8th Cir. 1976).  No one employee or officer must 
have all of the requisite knowledge.  Stuart H. Deming, The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act and the New International Norms 38 (2005).  Moreover, “[r]egardless of how 
disparate the knowledge may be within an entity, the collective knowledge of 
employees of the entity . . . can serve as the basis for establishing knowledge.”  Id.; see 
also Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313, 315 (10th Cir. 1951) 
(attributing knowledge to entity despite the fact that “[n]o single agent or representative 
in the offices of the company had actual knowledge of [the] conflicts and falsities); 
United States v. LBS Bank, 757 F.Supp. 496, 501 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (“[k]nowledge 
possessed by employees is aggregated so that a corporate defendant is considered to 
have acquired the collective knowledge of its employees . . .”).  Thus, if an H&Q officer 
had knowledge of the corrupt payments, the failure, at a minimum, to disavow the 
conduct may be construed as authorization or acquiescence on the part of H&Q.  Stuart 
H. Deming, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the New International Norms 39 
(2005). 
 90. Zarin, supra note 2, at 6-13; see also Donald R. Cruver, COMPLYING WITH THE 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 38-39, 54-55 (1999) (acknowledging that domestic 
concerns may face FCPA liability where “there is ongoing voting or operation 
control . . . , or where the parent and subsidiary have common officers or directors”). 
 91. It is also worth noting that business affiliations with foreign governments are 
particularly fertile ground for FCPA problems.  As one treatise has commented, “the 
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E. Complicated Arrangements with Consultants 
By now, commentators and corporations are well aware that 
semantics do not dictate liability; accounting for bribery as “consulting 
expenses” fools no one.92  The line separating legal and legitimate 
consulting agreements from mere conduits of bribery can be sketched 
out using details of the Justice Department’s own aggressive pursuit of 
FCPA prosecutions, as well as elements of emerging and increasingly 
complex consulting agreements.  Certain factors, such as the reputation 
of the agent, the agent’s compensation, and any suspicious 
accommodation requests, are relevant when determining whether a 
domestic company’s decision to hire a particular agent will trigger 
FCPA liability.93  If the consultants hired have a reputation for bribing 
officials, or other corrupt behavior, a presumption of knowing 
impropriety exists.94  Similarly, unreasonably large consulting fees in 
light of services provided will trigger a suspicion that part of the fee 
went toward an improper bribe.95  Moreover, the more likely it is that 
officers of the U.S. company knew of suspicious requests by the 
consultant,96 the easier the government’s decision to impute knowledge 
 
mere formation of a joint venture or establishment of an investment relationship with 
certain parties—for example, a foreign government official or someone closely 
connected to such an official—can raise FCPA issues.”  FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT v.1, 106.003 (2005).  The FCPA does not distinguish between government officials 
acting in a sovereign capacity and a government agency acting in a commercial 
capacity.  Accordingly, “virtually any transaction between a person subject to the FCPA 
and the employees of a state-owned entity . . . can raise FCPA issues.”  Id.  
Relationships with state-owned entities will not always give rise to FCPA liability; 
however, this sort of relationship raises issues that “must be addressed and [dictates 
that] risk mitigation steps need to be taken.”  Id.  Given the extremely limited role that 
San Yuan played in the management of BMD, a strong argument can be made that this 
relationship, though suspicious, was not ultimately prohibited under the FCPA. 
 92. The payment of fees to “consultants” who perform no services has been 
described as a paradigmatic example of an FCPA violation.  FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT v.1, 106.002 (2005). 
 93. Donald R. Cruver, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
47 (1999). 
 94. See id. at 48. 
 95. Id at 49. 
 96. Suspicious requests would include any sort of payment or business practice that 
is particularly unusual.  A request for an all cash payment, or that part of the payment 
be made out to a certain government official are obvious examples. 
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of this impropriety to the company.97
Even though they are not clearly prohibited by the text of the 
statute, these factors suggest that the third-party provisions of the FCPA 
implicitly prohibit many consulting agreements.  Consider the following 
example: a consultant was hired by a U.S. company to use his or her 
“connections” to help secure a contract with the government of the 
consultant’s home country.  While it is not the case that consulting 
agreements based on one’s connections are per se illegal, it is quite clear 
that consulting agreements based on a financial, rather than personal, 
relationship between said consultant and foreign officials can create 
FCPA problems.  If the hypothetical consultant described above made 
routine payments to the foreign official in order to protect, or establish, 
his or her relationships, the U.S. company’s knowledge of this 
arrangement likely satisfies the FCPA’s knowledge requirement, and 
suggests liability.  Even though the U.S. company is not making direct 
payments to the foreign official, and even though the consultant is not 
just passing along a percentage of the U.S. company’s payment to the 
public official, knowledge of an ongoing connection to a public official 
based on periodic payments is likely a sufficient basis for FCPA 
liability. 
In short, consulting agreements will subject an entity to FCPA 
liability if the “consultant” is in a corrupt relationship with the foreign 
official.  This is true even if the money being paid cannot be traced 
directly to the consulting payments made by the entity.  This theory of 
liability is consistent with a plain text of the FCPA.  A company in this 
situation will be well served by an early guilty plea. 
F. Foreign Entity Liability 
One of the most surprising developments in the Department of 
Justice’s implementation of the FCPA is the charging of foreign entities.  
The 2005 charging of Diagnostic Products was the first occurrence.  
This charge, and subsequent guilty plea, signals a potentially 
monumental shift in the prosecution of bribery: and one that lacks a 
solid legal basis.  More so than the other theories of FCPA liability 
discussed in this Article, the Justice Department’s newly clarified theory 
of foreign entity liability must be challenged in court.  The prosecution 
 
 97. Id. at 50. 
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of foreign entities, outside of certain narrowly defined statutory 
parameters, must be struck down by federal courts.  This conclusion is 
grounded in both textual interpretation and the extensive legislative 
history of the act. 
Prior to 1998, the FCPA did not apply to foreign companies other 
than “issuers” and foreign nationals.  The 1998 amendments expanded 
the FCPA to provide that a foreign company or person is now subject to 
liability if it causes, either directly or through an agent, an act in 
furtherance of the corrupt payment to take place while within the 
territory of the United States.98  It is, however, generally accepted that 
the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions do not apply to foreign subsidiaries 
of U.S. companies who are acting on their own behalf, and not as agents 
of covered persons.99
Prior to the Diagnostics charging,100 the Department of Justice had 
enforced the Act in a manner consistent with its unambiguous legislative 
history concerning foreign entity liability.  The Department of Justice, 
through a refusal to prosecute, had implicitly recognized that a foreign 
subsidiary of a U.S. issuer or domestic concern can not be an agent of its 
U.S. parent for FCPA purposes.101  Accordingly, until the Diagnostics 
case, it was safe to assume that foreign subsidiaries were not subject to 
FCPA liability unless the entity committed an act in furtherance of a 
prohibited payment while in the United States. 
Following the enforcement action in the Diagnostics case, foreign 
 98. 15 U.S.C. §78dd-3(a) (2005). 
 99. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-831, at 14 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).  The fact that foreign 
subsidiaries that do not satisfy the requirements for liability under the 1998 
amendments do not generally face prosecution under the FCPA is evidenced by the 
legislative history.  As enacted by the House, domestic concerns were specifically 
defined to include foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies.  The House viewed the 
exercise of jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries as necessary in order to foreclose “a 
massive loop-hole.”  H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 11-12 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).  The Senate, 
however, took a more restrictive approach to FCPA jurisdiction, and, in Conference, the 
House conformed to the Senate such that the final legislation did not extend the FCPA’s 
jurisdiction to foreign subsidiaries.  The feared loophole was minimized, according to 
the Conference Report, because the legislation made clear that “any issuer or domestic 
concern which engages in bribery [] indirectly through any other person or entity would 
[] be liable.”  H.R. REP. NO. 95-831, at 14 (1977) (Conf. Rep.). 
 100. See supra, notes 38-51 and accompanying text, discussing Diagnostic Products 
Corporation’s guilty plea to FCPA charges. 
 101. Stanley J. Marcuss, The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 1057 PLI/CORP 
1223, 1232 (1998). 
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entities that do not commit any acts within the U.S. must now face the 
possibility of charges under the FCPA.  Few commentators or 
practitioners have suggested that the Department of Justice’s position in 
charging Diagnostics is reasonable.102  Given the opportunity, courts 
will almost certainly strike such enforcement actions down as an 
unjustified extension of federal jurisdiction.  But until this happens, 
foreign companies engaged in dealings resembling an agency 
relationship with a U.S. company face the possibility of charges under 
the FCPA.  Realistically, the tandem effect of the ripeness doctrine 
barring defendants from seeking an advisory opinion resolving this 
question, and the priority that many directors will place on secreting 
these issues as much as possible, may prevent a much needed judicial 
check on these prosecutions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The examples of recent FCPA charges discussed in this Article 
prove that the expanding scope of the FCPA can no longer be viewed as 
theoretical.  Although the FCPA was born out of an SEC investigation 
based on voluntary disclosures, and featured an adolescence 
characterized by largely esoteric debate over ambiguous questions of 
statutory interpretation, the scope of the now-maturing FCPA is 
becoming alarmingly clear to U.S. companies and officers.  Through the 
Department of Justice’s aggressive enforcement of provisions and 
principles previously considered academic, the FCPA has come of age.  
It is finally possible to understand the severity and robustness of FCPA 
liability.  What began as a financial irritant for large companies has 
become the Justice Department’s primary tool in preventing corruption. 
In light of the aggressive stance taken by Justice Department 
officials in the cases discussed above, it is becoming increasingly clear 
that the Department of Justice is willing to prosecute entities and 
individuals for conduct that is not obviously actionable under a plain 
text reading of the FCPA.  The Department of Justice’s cavalier 
approach to FCPA liability is inconsistent with basic principles of 
 102. See, e.g., H. Lowell Brown, The Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S. 
Government’s Campaign Against International Bribery, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 407, 463 (1999)  (“[i]t would appear to be equally implausible that Congress 
would establish agency liability for foreign individuals while at the same time 
excluding foreign entities from liability under the same circumstances”). 
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federal jurisdiction, the plain text of the statute, and its extensive 
legislative history.  Unless a party is willing to litigate these issues, the 
Department of Justice’s assertion of prosecutorial force will continue to 
expand. 
Corporate defendants have a strong interest in resolving these 
matters quickly, given the flurry of unwanted media attention and the 
corresponding depreciation in stock value that accompanies a bribery 
scandal.  It is of great benefit to federal prosecutors that the incentive to 
litigate these cases is unusually low.  Corporate defendants will continue 
to operate under a regime in which prosecutors obtain guilty pleas to 
meritless charges unless there is a challenge to the Department of 
Justice’s authority to prosecute under the FCPA.  The FCPA presents a 
classic economic dilemma—the tragedy of the commons problem: 
although virtually all corporations stand to benefit from an aggressive 
litigation of these cases and the favorable case law that will likely result, 
no single corporate defendant has been willing to risk its reputation and 
the costs of litigating an issue that, in the normal context of public 
criminal defense, would have been heavily litigated by now. 
Distinct from the protracted appeals and habeas corpus proceedings 
that ensure the integrity of ordinary criminal prosecutions, FCPA 
prosecutions are characterized by self-reporting and guilty pleas.  
Though it is hard to muster much sympathy for American corporations 
charged with bribing foreign officials, the overwhelming incentive to 
plead these cases out has provided the Department of Justice with an 
unusual and unfair interpretive role over the FCPA.  The Department of 
Justice’s role as final interpreter must be stopped.  A creative 
collaboration, or courageous corporate defendant, is necessary in order 
to bring the FCPA back in line with traditional criminal statutes and 
basic principles of statutory interpretation.  There is no question that the 
FCPA’s incubation period—defined by more conversation and 
controversy than actual prosecution—has given way to an era of 
aggressive enforcement.  However, emboldened by early success, and 
likely aware of the free-rider dilemma the defendants are facing, the 
Department of Justice has begun to pursue unreasonable theories of 
FCPA liability.  Just as the FCPA has evolved from talk to action, it is 
time for FCPA defendants to take an active stance in opposing the 
unreasonable extensions of FCPA liability.  Only if defendants challenge 
the validity of these theories of FCPA liability will aggressive and 
unchecked prosecutions be brought under control. 
 
